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Early modern origins
W hat is a nation? Do nations have a right to self-determination? If so, does that mean that the national identity of citizens is best guaranteed 
by a system of democratic government, in which power is subject to open 
disputation and to the consent of the governed living within a carefully defined 
territory? And what o f nationalism? Does it differ from national identity? Is it 
compatible with democracy? If not, can its growth be prevented, or at least 
controlled, so as to guarantee the survival or growth of democracy?
These questions, pressingly familiar in contemporary politics although strangely 
neglected in contemporary political theory, have their roots in early modern 
Europe. With the decline of the Carolingian Empire, a new sense of collective 
identity, national awareness, began to emerge as a powerful social force. This 
process o f nation-building was championed initially by sections of the nobility 
and the clergy, who used derivatives of the old Latin term natio to highlight 
their dependence upon a common language and common historical 
experiences.’The »nation« did not refer to the whole population of a region, 
but only to those classes which had developed a sense of identity based upon 
language and history and had begun to act upon it. Nations in this sense were 
seen as distinctive products o f their own peculiar histories.
From the fifteenth century onwards, the term »nation« was employed increas­
ingly for political purposes. According to the classic definition of Diderot, a 
nation is »une quantité considérable de peuple qui habite une certaine étendue 
de pays, renferm ée dans de certaines limites, et qui obéit au même 
gouvernement«.2 Here »nation« described a people who shared certain com­
mon laws and political institutions of a given territory. This political concep­
tion o f »the nation« defined and included the societas civilis -  those citizens
1. Helmut Beumann and W. Schroeder (eds.), Aspekte der nationenbildung im M ittelalter 
(Sigmaringen 1978); Helmut Beumann, »Zur Nationenbildung im Mittelalter«, in Otto Dann 
(ed.), Nationalism us in vorindustrieller Zeit (Munich 1986), pp. 21-33; and Bernard Guenée, 
L ’O ccident aux X lVe àX V e siècles  (Paris, 1981), chapter 3.
2. Encyclopédie  (17 volum es, Paris, 1751-1765), volume 11, p. 36.
Fil. vest./A c ta  Phil., XIV (2/1993), 35-55.
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who were entitled to participate in politics and to share in the exercise of 
sovereignty -  and it had fundamental implications for the process o f 
state-building. Struggles for participation in the state assumed the form of 
confrontations between the monarch and the privileged classes, which were 
often organized in a parliament. These classes frequently designated them­
selves as advocates of »the nation« in the political sense of the term. They 
insisted, in opposition to their monarch, that they were the representatives and 
defenders of »national liberties« and »national rights«.3 If the sovereign mon­
arch came from a different nation -  as in the Netherlands during the war 
against Habsburg Spain -  then such claims were sharpened by another dimen­
sion: the struggle for privileged liberties was transformed into a movement for 
national emancipation from foreign tyranny.4
During the eighteenth century, the struggle for national identity was broadened 
and deepened to include the non-privileged classes. Self-educated middle 
classes, artisans, rural and urban labourers, and other social groups demanded 
inclusion in »the nation«, and this necessarily had anti-aristocratic and 
anti-monarchic implications. From hereon, in principle, the nation included 
everybody, not just the privileged classes; »the people« and »the nation« were 
supposed to be identical. Thomas Paine's Rights o f  Man (1791-2) was the most 
influential European attempt to »democratize« the theory o f national identity.5 
Rights o f  Man sparked bitter public controversies about the merits o f monar­
chies and republics, forced Paine into permanent exile from his native England 
hunted by death threats, and led to a general crackdown against »Paineites«, all 
for suggesting that each nation is entitled to its own system of representative 
government.
Paine had first proposed this thesis during the American Revolution and 
several o f his eighteenth-century contemporaries -  Vattel and Sieyès for 
example -  had explored, or were exploring, the same theme. But Rights o f  Man 
examined the political dimensions of national identity with unprecedented 
intellectual fire. Paine's prose burned with the drama of the French Revolution. 
Its bristling optimism also reflected the breakthroughs o f the American Revo­
lution: the declaration of the natural and civil rights of the sovereign people of
3. The example o f  the English Parliament during the Tudor period is analyzed by G.R. Elton, 
»English national self-consciousness and the Parliament in the sixteenth century«, in Otto 
Dann (ed.), Nationalismus in vorindustrieller Zeit (M unich 1986), pp. 73-82. The French 
case is considered in R. Bickart, Les P arlem ents e t la notion de souveraineté national (Paris 
1932).
4. The case of the Netherlands is examined in Johan Huizinga, »How Holland became anation«, 
in his Verzamelde Werken (9 volumes, Haarlem, 1948-1953), volum e 2, pp. 266-283.
5. Thomas Paine, Rights ofMan. P art F irst and Rights o f  Man. P art Second, in Philip S. Foner 
(ed.), The Complete Writings o f  Thomas Paine  (N ew  York, 1945), pp. 243-458.
Nations, Nationalism and the European Citizen 37
a nation, including the right to resist unlawful government, and the establish­
ment o f a republican democracy on a wholly new federal basis. Paine spat at 
the court and government o f George III and warned all other monarchic rulers 
that the outbreak o f revolution in Europe heralded a new dawn for democratic 
principles. »Monarchy is all a bubble, a mere court artifice to procure money«, 
he wrote, although he admitted that the pompous power and money-grubbing 
o f monarchy still trapped the world in a cage of war and rumours of war. 
»There are men in all countries,« he continued, »who get their living by war 
and by keeping up the quarrels o f nations.« He nevertheless insisted, in the 
face o f this trend, that citizens of all nations, united in their love of republican 
democracy, had a duty to expose the taxing hypocrisy, fraud and gun-running 
of monarchic despotisms, understood as aggressive governments accountable 
only to themselves. And he concluded that the struggle for representative 
government -  for periodic elections, fixed-term legislatures, a universal fran­
chise, and freedom of assembly, the press and other civil liberties -  required 
recognition o f the right of each nation to determine its own destiny. »What is 
government more than the management of the affairs of a nation?«, he asked. 
»It is not«, he answered. »Sovereignty as a matter of right, appertains to the 
nation only, and not to any individual; and a nation has at all times an inherent 
indefeasible right to abolish any form of government it finds inconvenient, and 
establish such as accords with its interest, disposition, and happiness.«6
Paine's thesis that the nation and democratic government constitute an indivis­
ible unity subsequently enjoyed a long and healthy life. Nineteenth-century 
Europe saw the emergence of two great powers (Germany and Italy) based on 
the principle o f national self-determination, the effective partition of a third 
(Austria-Hungary after the Compromise of 1867) on identical grounds, two 
revolts o f the Poles in support of their reconstitution as a nation-state, and the 
formal recognition o f a chain o f lesser independent states claiming to represent 
their sovereign nations, from Luxembourg and Belgium in the west to the 
Ottoman successor states in south-eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, 
Romania). During our own century, especially after the First World War, the 
principle o f »the right to national self-determination« enjoyed considerable 
popularity among international lawyers, political philosophers, governments 
and their opponents, who supposed that if the individual members of a nation 
so will it, they are entitled to freedom from domination by other nations, and 
can therefore legitimately establish a sovereign state covering the territory in 
which they live, and where they constitute a majority of the population. From 
this perspective, the principle that citizens should govern themselves was 
identified with the principle that nations should determine their own destiny,
6. Rights o f  Man. P art First, in Philip S. Foner (ed.), The Complete Writings o f  Thomas Paine 
(N ew  York, 1945), p .341.
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and this in turn produced a convergence of meaning o f the terms »state« and 
»nation«. »State« and »nation« came to be used interchangeably, as in such 
official expressions as »League o f Nations«, the »law of nations« or 
»nation-state«, and in the commonplace English language usage o f the term 
»national« to designate anything run or regulated by the state, such as national 
service, national health insurance or national debt. Such expressions reinforce 
the assumption, traceable to the eighteenth century, that there is no other way 
of defining the word nation than as a territorial aggregate whose various parts 
recognize the authority of the same state, an assumption captured in K.arl 
Deutsch's famous definition of a nation as »a people who have hold o f a 
state«.7
The principle that nations should be represented within a territorially defined 
state echoes into our times. In the European region -  to mention several 
exam ples-the birth of Solidarnošć and the defeat of martial law in Poland, the 
dramatic velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia, the collapse of the Berlin Wall 
to the trumpet sounds of »Wir sind ein Volk«, and the successful struggle of 
the Demos government and its supporters to achieve Slovenian independence 
simply cannot be understood without reference to this equation. The same 
powerful dynamic worked to secure the collapse o f the Soviet Empire. The 
Soviet Union was an empire comprising a diversity o f nationalities all subject 
to the political dominance of a Russian-dominated Communist Party that 
ensured for seven decades that the federal units o f the Union had no meaning­
ful political autonomy and that demands for »national communism« would 
trigger a political crackdown backed if necessary by military force.
This multi-national empire harboured a self-paralyzing contradiction. The 
Party insisted on subjects« conformity to its Russified definition o f policies for 
securing »socialism«, all the while governing through national cadres, promot­
ing national cultures, encouraging education in the local language and even 
talking o f eventual rapprochement (sblizhenie) and assimilation o f nations 
(.slyvanie). From the Kruschev period onwards, this contradiction fostered not 
only the growth of national nomenklatura who ran the republics, particularly 
in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, as fiefdoms controlled by Party »mafias« 
rooted in circles of friends, kinship networks and local and regional systems of 
patronage. It also stimulated the growth o f civil societies expressing them­
selves in a national idiom, protesting against Russification and ecology- dam­
aging, enforced industrialization and demanding »democracy« and »indepen­
dence«, thereby lunging with a dagger at the heart of the imperial system 
structured by the leading role of the Russian-centred Party.8
7. Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Its A lternatives (New York, 1969), p. 19.
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National identity and citizenship
The collapse o f the Soviet Empire under pressure from struggles for national 
self-determination adds weight to the thesis that a shared sense o f national 
identity, in Hungary and Russia no less than in Scotland and Slovenia, is a 
basic precondition of the creation and strengthening of citizenship and democ­
racy. Understood in ideal-typical terms, national identity is a particular form of 
collective identity in which, despite their routine lack o f physical contact, 
people consider themselves bound together because they speak a language or a 
dialect of a common language; inhabit or are closely familiar with a defined 
territory, and experience its ecosystem with some affection; and because they 
share a variety o f customs, including a measure of memories of the historical 
past, which is consequently experienced in the present tense as pride in the 
nation's achievements and, where necessary, an obligation to feel ashamed of 
the nation's failing.9
National identity so defined is a specifically modern European invention and 
its political importance is that it infuses citizens with a sense o f purposeful­
ness, confidence and dignity by encouraging them to feel »at home«. It enables 
them to decipher the signs of institutional and everyday life. The activity of 
others -  the food they prepare, the products they manufacture, the songs they 
sing, the jokes they tell, the clothes they wear, the looks on their faces, the 
words they speak -  can be recognized. That familiarity in turn endows each 
individual with a measure o f confidence to speak and to act. Consequently, 
whatever is strange is not automatically feared; whatever diversity exists 
within the nation is more or less accepted as one of its constitutive features. 
The borders between a national identity and its »neighbouring« identities (of 
class, gender, religion, race, for example) are vaguely defined and its security 
police and border guards are unreliable and tolerant.10 There is even some 
acceptance of the fact that members of the same nation can legitimately 
disagree about the meaning and extent of their nationhood. This tolerance of 
difference is possible precisely because nationhood equips members of a
8. Klaus von Beyme, »Social and econom ic conditions for ethnic strife in the Soviet Union«, in 
Alastair M cAuley (ed.), Soviet Federalism , Nationalism and Economic Decentralisation  
(Leicester and London, 1991), pp. 89-109; and Adam Michnik, »Nationalism«, Social 
Research, volume 58, number 4 ,(Winter 1991), pp. 757-763.
9. The contours o f  national identity are well examined in Philip Schlesinger, »On national 
identity: som e conceptions and misconceptions criticized«, Social Science Information, 26, 
2 (1987), pp. 219-264; Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism  (Oxford 1983); and Benedict 
Anderson, Im agined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f  Nationalism  
(Revised edition; London and N ew  York, 1991)
10. The spatial metaphor o f  boundaries is developed in Fredrik Barth, »Ethnic Groups and 
Boundaries«, in P rocess an d  Form in Social Life: Selected Essays o f  Fredrik Barth (London 
1981), pp. 198-227.
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nation with a sense of belonging and a security in themselves and in each 
other: they can say »we« and »you« without feeling that their »I«, their sense 
of self, is slipping from their possession.
Whenever they are denied access to a shared sense o f nationhood citizens tend 
to experience the world as unfriendly and alien -  in the extreme case of 
enforced exile they experience the nasty, gnawing and self-pitying and 
self-destructive Hauptweg described by Thomas Mann and others -  and this 
renders them less capable of living democratically. After all, democratic 
regimes are the most demanding of political systems. In contrast to all forms of 
heteronomous government democracy comprises procedures for arriving at 
collective decisions through public controversies and compromises based on 
the fullest possible and qualitatively best participation o f interested parties.11 
At a minimum, democratic procedures include equal and universal adult suf­
frage within constituencies of various scope and size; majority rule and guar­
antees o f minority rights, which ensure that collective decisions are approved 
by a substantial number of those expected to make them; freedom from 
arbitrary arrest and respect for the rule o f law among citizens and their 
representatives; constitutional guarantees o f freedom of assembly and expres­
sion and other civil and political liberties, which help ensure that those ex­
pected to decide or to elect those who decide can choose among real alterna­
tives; and various social policies (in fields such as health, education, child care 
and basic income provision) which prevent market exchanges from becoming 
dominant and thereby ensure that citizens can live as free equals by enjoying 
their basic political and civil entitlements. Expressed differently, democracy 
requires the institutional division between a certain form o f state and civil 
society. A democracy is an openly structured system o f institutions which 
facilitate the flexible control of the exercise o f power. It is a multilayered 
political and social mosaic in which political decision-makers at the local, 
regional, national and supranational levels are assigned the job of serving the 
res publica, while, for their part, citizens living within the nooks and crannies 
o f civil society are obliged to exercise vigilance in preventing each other and 
their rulers from abusing their powers and violating the spirit o f  the common­
wealth.
Although democracy in this sense does not require citizens to play the role of 
full-time political animals -  too much democracy can kill off democracy - it is 
always difficult to generate or to sustain its momentum. That task is rendered 
even more arduous in contexts lacking traditions which are home to the virtues
11. John Keane, Dem ocracy and C ivil Society. On the Predicam ents o f  European Socialism , the 
P rospectsfor democracy an d  the problem  o f  C ontrolling Social an d  P olitica l P ow er  (London  
and N ew  York, 1988) and The M edia an d  D em ocracy  (Oxford, 1991).
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o f democratic citizenship: prudence, common sense, self-reliance, courage, 
sensitivity to power, the knack o f making and defending judgements in public, 
the ability to (self-) criticize and to accept criticism from others in turn, and the 
capacity to join with others in dignity and solidarity to resist the enervating 
miasma of fear. The last-mentioned quality is especially important in the 
democratic transformation of despotic regimes, when fear of power corrupts 
those who are subject to it and fear of losing power corrupts those who 
exercise it.
Shaking off fear is always a basic condition of democracy and it is normally 
assisted by citizens« shared sense of belonging to one or more ethical identi­
ties, national identity being among the most potent of these. Fearlessness is not 
a naturally occurring substance. It is a form of courage or »grace under 
pressure« (Aung San Suu Kyi) developed wherever victims o f political lies 
and bullying and violence make a personal effort to throw off personal corrup­
tion and to draw on their inner and outer resources to nurture the habit of 
refusing to let fear dictate their actions. Grace under pressure normally pre­
cedes and underpins attempts to institutionalize democracy. To be effective, it 
must be practised in small daily acts of resistance that in turn feed upon 
citizens« sense that they speak a common language and share a natural habitat 
and a variety of customs and historical experiences.
Consider Poland: The experience o f more than a century of foreign domination 
after the partitions of 1772, 1793 and 1795, by which Poland was carved up by 
the Russian empire, the Habsburg Monarchy and the kingdom of Prussia, 
nurtured a distinctive national consciousness among the nobility (szlachta) of 
that country. During the nineteenth century, these Poles considered themselves 
(and were widely regarded) as fighters for the freedom of humanity, as a nation 
martyred in the cause o f democratic liberty. Their shared sense of nationhood 
merged with the ability to act gracefully under pressure; to be Polish meant the 
refusal to be bullied and intimidated by power. The leader of the revolt of 
1794, Tadeusz Kosciuszko, a friend of Thomas Paine's, was a hero to all 
European democrats and his name was celebrated in America and even in 
Australia, whose highest mountain is named after him. The Polish legions 
organized by Henryk Dabrowski took as their slogan »for our liberty and 
yours« (za nasza i wasza wolnosc) and Polish patriots played a prominent part 
in the 1848 revolutions in Hungary, Germany and Italy. Today, the national 
identity crystallized in such experiences surprises and even perplexes many 
people who are not Polish. The Poles are sometimes seen as brash and crafty 
anarchists who have a deeply romantic soul traceable to poets such as Adam 
Mickiewicz, who viewed Poland as the Christ of Nations, crucified so that it 
could be resurrected and all other nations could be redeemed. Traces of such 
arrogance are indeed still evident in various parts of today's political spectrum
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in Poland, especially in the call for a »Catholic State of the Polish Nation«. 
But, overall, the messianic fervour with which certain nineteenth-century 
Poles reacted to misfortune and oppression has receded. A striking feature of 
contemporary Polish national identity is its embrace of the language o f demo­
cratic freedom; as Adam Michnik remarked in the mid-1980s, the Polish 
struggle for freedom against military dictatorship and communist empire was 
simultaneously a struggle for the freedom of humanity.12
The rise o f  nationalism
The preceding analysis appears to confirm the eighteenth-century doctrine of 
national self-determination. It implies that Paine and others were correct in 
thinking that the defense of »the nation« and the struggle for democracy 
against political despotism are identical, that when the winds o f national 
feeling blow, the people, like beautiful birds, grow wings and fly their way to a 
land of independence. And yet the experience o f the French Revolution, which 
inspired Paine's Rights o f Man, casts doubt upon any such conclusion. For a 
time, the rise of Louis Napoleon seemed to reveal a political weakness specific 
to the French. Paine drew this conclusion and returned to America, wings 
under his arms. Only in our time, after the logic o f the French revolution has 
been broadly repeated in so many countries, has it become possible to discern 
the operation of a new aspect of modernity, the unfolding o f a process in which 
the French Revolution proved to be a fundamental watershed. The Revolution 
destroyed forever the faith in the divine and unchallengeable right of monarchs 
to govern and it sparked a struggle against the privileged classes in the name of 
a sovereign nation of free and equal individuals. Those acting in the name of 
the sovereign nation were ever more tempted to emphasize faithfulness to la 
patrie, that is, citizens« obligations to their state, itself the guarantor o f the 
nation, itself said to be »one and indivisible«. The motto o f the ancien régime, 
»Un roi, une foi, une loi« (»One king, one faith, one law«) was replaced by »La 
Nation, la loi, le roi« (»The Nation, the law, the king«). Thenceforward the 
Nation made the law which the king was responsible for implementing. And 
when the monarchy was abolished in August 1792, the Nation became the 
titular source of sovereignty. »Vive la Nation!« cried the French soldiers one 
month later at Valmy, as they flung themselves into battle against the Prussian 
army. Everything which had been royal had now become national. The nation 
even had its own emblem, the tricoloured national flag, which replaced the 
white flag of the house of Bourbon. The new spirit o f nationalism  had sur­
faced, bringing with it a lust for the power and glory o f the nation-state which
12. Jan Jozef Lipski, »Two Fatherlands - Two Patriotisms«, Survey, volum e 26, number 4 
(Autumn 1982), pp. 159-175.
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finally overwhelmed the democratic potential of the revolution. The first 
nationalist dictatorship of the modern world was born.
The formation o f a despotic regime sustained by nationalist appeals to the 
nation was an utterly novel development -  Europe's Greek gift to itself and to 
the rest o f the world.13 Since that time, and despite its extraordinary global 
impact, the eighteenth-century doctrine of national self-determination has 
been subject to a smouldering crisis, whose contemporary resolution necessi­
tates both a fundamental re-thinking of that doctrine, a more complex under­
standing o f the relationship between national identity and nationalism, and 
greater clarity about the nature of democratic procedures.
Max Weber once defined democracy for the benefit of General Ludendorff, 
and with his approval, as a political system in which the people choose a leader 
who then says, »Now shut your mouths and obey me«.14 The impatience with 
ongoing public clashes o f opinion and disagreement implied in this definition 
o f democracy misses one of its quintessential features. Democratic procedures 
tend to maximize the level o f reversibility or »biodegradability« of decision 
making. They invite dispute and encourage public dissatisfaction with cur­
rently existing conditions, even from time to time stirring up citizens to anger 
and direct action. Under enduring despotisms -  Salazar's Portugal or Brezhnev's 
R ussia-th ings are otherwise. Time appears to stand still. Individuals continue 
to be born, to mature, to work and to love, to play and to quarrel, to have 
children and to die, and yet everything around them becomes motionless, 
petrified and repetitious. Political life becomes utterly boring.
In fully democratic systems, by contrast, everything is in perpetual motion. 
Endowed with liberties to criticize and to transform the distribution of power 
within state and civil institutions, citizens are catapulted into a state of perma­
nent unease which they can cope with, grumble about, turn their backs on, but 
never fully escape. The unity o f purpose and sense o f community o f 
pre-democratic societies snaps. There is difference, openness and constant 
competition among a plurality of power groups to produce and to control the 
definition o f reality. Hence there are public scandals which unfold when 
publics learn about events which had been kept secret because if they had been 
made public ahead o f time they could not have been carried out without public 
outcries. Under democratic conditions the world feels as if it is gripped by
13. Jacques Godechot, La Grande Nation  (2nd edition; Paris, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, Nations 
and N ationalism  since I 7S0(Cam bridgeandNew York, 1990); Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations 
and States. An Enquiry into the O rigins o f  Nations and the Politics o f  Nationalism  (London 
1977); and Benedict Anderson, Im agined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and  
S pread o f  Nationalism  (London and N ew  York 1991).
14. Cited in Marianne Weber, Max Weber: A Biography (New York and London, 1975), p. 653.
44 John Keane
capaciousness and uncertainty about who does and should govern. Existing 
relations o f power are treated (and understood) as contingent, as lacking 
transcendental guarantees of absolute certainty and hierarchical order, as a 
product o f institutionally situated actors exercising power within and over 
their respective milieux.
It is this self-questioning, self-destabilizing quality of democratic regimes 
which not only provides opportunities for the advocates o f national identity to 
take their case to a wider public. It also increases the magnetism o f 
anti-democratic ideologies such as nationalism. Democratic conditions can 
severely test citizens« shared sense o f the unreality o f reality and chronic 
instability of their regimes, to the point where they may crave for the restora­
tion o f certainty about »reality« by suppressing diversity, complexity and 
openness within and between the state and civil society. Democracies never 
reach a point of homeostatic equilibrium. They are dogged permanently by 
public disagreements about means and ends, by uncertainties, confusions and 
gaps within political programmes, and by hidden and open conflicts, and all 
this makes them prey to forms of post-prison psychosis (Havel), morbid 
attempts to simplify matters, to put a stop to pluralism and to foist Unity and 
Order onto everybody and everything.
The events of the French Revolution revealed this dynamic for the first time, 
confirming the rule that whenever believers in a nation assemble they risk 
being seduced by the language and power fantasies of nationalism. The dis­
tinction between national identity and nationalism -  overlooked by many 
commentaries on the subject, including Eric Hobsbawm's Nations and Nation­
alism since 178015 -  is fundamental in this context. Nationalism is the child of 
democratic pluralism -  both in the sense that the existence o f open state 
institutions and a minimum of civil liberties enables nationalists to organize 
and to propagate their nationalism, but also in the less obvious sense that 
democracy breeds insecurity about power and sometimes fear and panic and, 
hence, the yearning of some citizens to take refuge in sealed forms o f life.
In the European region, nationalism is at present among the most virile and 
magnetic o f these closed systems of life, or what I prefer to call ideologies.16 
Like other ideologies, nationalism is an upwardly mobile, power-hungry and 
potentially dominating form of language game which makes falsely universal 
claims. It supposes that it is part of the natural order o f things and that the 
Nation is a biological fact, all the while hiding its own particularity by masking
15. Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780  (Cambridge 1990).
16. John Keane, »The Modern Democratic revolution: Reflections on Lyotard's The Postm odern
C ondition«, in Andrew Benjamin (ed.), Judging L yotard  (London and N ew  York 1992), pp.
81-98.
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its own conditions o f production and by attempting to stifle the plurality of 
non-national and sub-national language games within the established civil 
society and state in which it thrives.
Nationalism is a scavenger. It feeds upon the pre-existing sense of nationhood 
within a given territory, transforming that shared national identity into a 
bizarre parody o f its former self. Nationalism is a pathological form of national 
identity which tends (as Milorad Pavić points out in Dictionary o f  the Khazars) 
to destroy its heterogeneity by squeezing the nation into the Nation. National­
ism also takes advantage o f any democratizing trends by roaming hungrily 
through civil society and the state, harassing other particular language games, 
viewing them as competitors and enemies to be banished or terrorized, injured 
or eaten alive, pretending all the while that it is a universal language game 
whose validity is publicly unquestionable, and which therefore views itself as 
freed from the contingencies o f historical time and space.
Nationalism has a fanatical core. Its boundaries are dotted with border posts 
and border police charged with the task of monitoring the domestic and foreign 
enemies of the Nation. In contrast to national identity, whose boundaries are 
not fixed and whose tolerance of difference and openness to other forms of life 
is qualitatively greater, nationalism requires its adherents to believe in them­
selves and to believe in the belief itself, to believe that they are not alone, that 
they are members o f a community of believers known as the Nation, through 
which they can achieve immortality. Nationalism requires them and their 
leader-representatives (as Ernest Renan put it in Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?) to 
participate in »un plebiscite de tous les jours«. This level of ideological 
commitment ensures that nationalism is driven by a bovine will to simplify 
things - by the kind of instruction issued by Bismarck: »Germans! Think with 
your blood!«
If democracy is a continuous struggle against simplification of the world, then 
nationalism is a continuous struggle to undo complexity, a will not to know 
certain matters, a chosen ignorance, not the ignorance of innocence. It thereby 
has a tendency to crash into the world, crushing or throttling everything that 
crosses its path, to defend or to claim territory, and to think of land as power 
and its native inhabitants as a »single fist« (Ayaz Mutalibov). Nationalism has 
nothing of the humility of national identity. It feels no shame about the past or 
the present, for it supposes that only foreigners and »enemies of the nation« are 
guilty. It revels in macho glory and fills the national memory with stories of 
noble ancestors, heroism and bravery in defeat. It feels itself invincible, waves 
the flag and, if necessary, eagerly bloodies its hands on its enemies.
At the heart o f nationalism - and among the most peculiar features of its 
»grammar« - is its simultaneous treatment of the Other as everything and
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nothing. Nationalists warn of the menace to their own way of life by the 
growing presence of aliens. The Other is seen as the knife in the throat of the 
Nation. Nationalists are panicky and driven by friend-foe calculations, suffer­
ing from a judgement disorder that convinces them that the Other nation lives 
at its own expense. Nationalists are driven by the feeling that all nations are 
caught up in an animal struggle for survival, and that only the fittest survive. 
Every other speech of Jörg Haider o f the FPÖ in Austria insinuates that »East 
Europeans« are endangering the state, the constitution and democracy. 
Neo-Nazis in the new half of Germany shout »Ausländer 'raus!«, liken Poles to 
hungry pigs, attribute shortages o f bicycles to the Vietnamese and the lack o f 
food to the Jews, and accuse Turks of taking over German communities. 
French supporters of Jean-Marie Le Pen warn of the Arab »invasion« of 
France. Lithuanian anti-semites whisper the old stories about the Jews who 
once sacrificed Christian children and used their blood to make Passover 
bread, and recall the same blood libelous tales o f Jewish grain merchants and 
millers who put glass in their flour to make Gentile women bleed when they 
kneaded the dough. Croatian nationalists denounce Serbians as četniks or as 
Bolshevik butchers who murder their victims and mutilate their bodies; Serbian 
nationalists reciprocate by denouncing Croats as Ustaše fascists who are 
hellbent on eliminating the Serbian nation. Both curse Muslims as foreign 
invaders o f a land in which they have in fact lived for five centuries.
Yet nationalism is not only fearful o f the Other. It is also arrogant, confidently 
portraying the Other as inferior rubbish, as a worthless zero. The Other is seen 
as unworthy of respect or recognition because its smelly breath, strange food, 
unhygienic habits, loud and off-beat music, and incomprehensible babbling 
language places it outside and beneath Us. It follows that the Other has few if 
any entitlements, not even when it constitutes a majority or minority o f the 
population resident in the vicinity o f Our Nation. Wherever a member o f the 
Nation is, there is the Nation. It is true (as Lenin emphasized) that the national­
ism of a conquering nation should be distinguished from the nationalism of 
those whom they conquer, and that conquering nationalism always seems 
uglier and more culpable. It is also true that nationalism can be more or less 
militant, and that its substantive themes can be highly variable, ranging from 
attachment to consumption and a treasured form of currency to boundary-altering 
forms o f political separatism. Yet despite such variations nationalists suffer 
from a single-minded arrogance. This leads them to taunt and spit at the Other, 
to label them as wogs, Scheiss and tapis, to discriminate against them in 
institutional settings, to prohibit the public use o f minority languages 
(»linguicide«), or even, in the extreme case, to press for the expulsion o f the 
Other for the purpose of creating a homogeneous territorial nation.
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This murderous reductio ad absurdum of nationalism surfaced on the southern 
fringes o f Europe during and after World War I, with the mass extirpation of 
Armenians from Turkey in 1915 and, after the crushing defeat of the Greek 
army by the Turks in Anatolia in 1922, the expulsion by Greece of some 
400,000 Turks and a reciprocal expulsion by the Turks of perhaps 1.5 million 
destitute and panic stricken Greeks from the lands of Asia Minor, where they 
had lived with others since the time of Homer.17 The herding and murdering of 
nations was repeated by Stalin and by Hitler, who insisted on the elimination 
o f the Jews and others and organized the transfer of South Tyrolians and other 
German-speaking peoples living outside the Vaterland to Germany itself, The 
same bizarre and bloody process has lately reappeared in the armed defense of 
»Serbian autonomous republics« and the military occupation by Serbia of 
Kosovo in former Yugoslavia. The Kosovo region in fact proved to be the 
testing ground of Serbian expansionism. Its nationalist spokesmen, tossed 
between the horns of arrogance and fear common to all nationalists, attacked 
Albanian Kosovars as dirty, backward Muslims who are not a genuine Yugoslav 
nation (nacija) but a mere unimportant nationality (nacionalnost) of non-Slavs. 
At the same time, they viewed Kosovars as fanatical conquerors, calling for 
»the severing o f the right hand of all those who carry the green flag of Islam« 
(Vuk Draskovic) in the historic cradle of the Serbian Nation, where King 
Lazar and his army were slaughtered while defending Christendom and civili­
zation against the crescent and scimitar of all-conquering Islam. This same 
view of Muslims as worthless invaders is currently tearing Bosnia-Herzegovina 
to shreds. European Muslims -  the Jews of the late twentieth century -  are shot 
at, herded at gunpoint from their burning homes, summarily executed in 
nearby houses or marched in columns to railway sidings past rotting corpses to 
concentration camps, where they are raped or castrated, and then made to wait, 
with bulging eyes and lanternous faces, for the arrival of their own death.
National self-determination?
This confusion cannot be undone by speculative arguments between those who 
conclude that »nationalism is the ideology of the twenty-first century« (Conor 
Cruise O'Brien) and their opponents who rely on the equally broad brushed 
conclusion that »the Owl of Minerva is now hovering over nations and nation­
alism« (Hobsbawm). Such generalizations understate the uneven patterns of 
distribution o f European nationalism, simplify its multiple causes, and 
shortcircuit the normative and strategic problem of how to disarm nationalism. 
As I see it, there is an urgent need to stretch the limits o f the contemporary
17. See Charles B. Eddy, Greece and the Greek Refugees (London 1931 ), and C. A. Macartney, 
»Refugees«, in E ncyclopedia o f  the Social Sciences (London 1931), volume 13, pp.200-205.
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sociological and democratic imagination, to think differently about the inter­
twined problems of nationalism, national identity and democracy, and to 
consider how the limits of democracy can be overcome in practice by invent­
ing new democratic methods o f preventing the growth o f democracy's own 
poisonous fruits.
Solving the problem of nationalism by democratic means is possible, but not 
easy. The thesis presented here is that since democratic mechanisms facilitate 
the transformation of national identity into nationalism, democracy is best 
served by abandoning the doctrine of national self-determination and regard­
ing a shared sense of national identity as a legitimate but limited form o f life. 
This thesis contains a paradoxical corollary: national identity, an important 
support o f democratic institutions, is best preserved by restricting its scope in 
favour of non-national identities that reduce the probability o f its transforma­
tion into anti-democratic nationalism.
In the European context it is now possible to envisage -  by means o f this thesis 
-  a cluster of four interdependent mechanisms which together can curb the 
force of nationalism and at the same time guarantee citizens« access to their 
respective national identities:
1. The first of these remedies is to decentre the institutions of the nation-state 
through the development of interlocking networks o f democratically account­
able sub-national and supra-national state institutions. Their combined effect, 
if rendered accountable to their citizens, would be to improve the effectiveness 
and legitimacy of state institutions and, more pertinently, to complicate the 
lines of political power, thereby reducing the room for manoeuvre o f single 
nation-states and frustrating the nationalist fantasy o f securing nations through 
strong, sovereign states that are prepared in principle to launch war on their 
neighbours or to crush their domestic opponents in the name of national 
preservation or salvation.
In effect, this remedy involves renewing -  but at the same time democratizing - 
the more complex patterns of political power typical of the late medieval and 
early modern periods. The modern process o f European state-building entailed 
the eclipse of numerous units of power -  free cities, principalities, provinces, 
estates, manors, and deliberative assemblies -  such that the five hundred or so 
political units that dotted the region in 1500 were reduced to around 25 units in 
1900. There are now signs of a reversal o f this process o f building centralized 
state institutions. One symptom of this »scattering« of political power is the 
renewed interest in local government as a flexible forum for conducting local 
politics and competently administering local policies, partly in response to the 
declining effectiveness of macroeconomic management and the retreat o f the 
national welfare state in western Europe.18
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The same decentreing of the nation state »downwards and sideways« is evi­
dent in the vigorous development of regional ideas and regional power in areas 
such as Catalonia, Wallonia, Emilia-Romagna, Andalucia, Scotland and the 
Basque region. Especially striking is the rapid growth and competitive success 
o f industrial regions comprising interdependent networks of firms caught up in 
a process o f double convergence (Sabel). Large firms increasingly attempt to 
decentralize into looser networks of operating units, subsidiaries and subcon­
tractors producing more specialized products through more flexible produc­
tion methods. Meanwhile, small firms attempt to build themselves into the 
wider forms o f loan finance, marketing facilities, research and development 
and other common services for which large firms were once renowned, and 
which are now provided increasingly at the regional level.19
Finally, the trend towards a Europe des regions has been supplemented by the 
accelerating growth o f supra-national political institutions such as the Euro­
pean Parliament, the Council o f Europe, and the European Court of Justice. An 
earlier phase o f experiments with inter-governmental negotiations and eco­
nomic cooperation has been complemented by a process of treaty-making and 
a drive to political and legal union which, although still highly undemocratic 
and controversial, is likely to prove as consequential for the political shape of 
Europe as the Congress ofVienna in 1814, the Treaty ofVersailles in 1919, or 
the Yalta Summit in 1945.
Member states o f the European Community are required increasingly to accept 
the acquis communautaire, the body of treaties, laws and directives which 
have been agreed by its makers; there is a relative shift away from policy 
making by consensus towards qualified majority voting; and a consequent 
quickening pace o f Euro-legislation in all policy fields. In 1970, for example, 
the Council of Ministers, on which each member government has a representa­
tive, adopted 345 regulations, decisions and directives (the three types of 
Community law); by 1987 that total had reached 623, and it has risen further 
since that time. From standards o f central heating and housing to the purity of 
beer and wine, the cleanliness of beaches and the conditions of women's 
employment, the populations of the EC are increasingly touched and shaped by 
European political integration. This process arguably hastens the decline of 
nation state sovereignty and facilitates the birth of a post-national Europe, in 
the sense that it adds to the pressure on nationalist movements, parties, govern­
ments and leaders to recognize the fact and legitimacy o f countervailing
18. Richard Batley and Gerry Stoker (eds.), Local Government in Europe: Trends and Develop­
ments (London, 1991)].
19. See Charles Sabel, »Flexible specialisation and the re-emergence o f  regional economies«, in 
P. Hirst and J. Zeitlin (eds.), R eversing Industrial D ecline? Industrial Structure and Policy  
in B ritain an d  her C om petitors  (Oxford, 1989), pp. 17-70.
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political powers, even in such sensitive matters as »national economic policy« 
and the resolution of so-called »national conflicts«.
2. The formulation and application of internationally recognized legal guaran­
tees of national identity is a vital adjunct of the breaking down of the sover­
eignty of the nation state. Such formal guarantees were pioneered in the four 
Geneva Conventions commencing in 1929 and expressed forcefully in the 
Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man ratified by the United Nations in 
December, 1948: »Everyone is entitled to the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this declaration, without distinction o f any kind such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, prop­
erty, birth, or other status.« (italics mine)
The Badinter proposals for resolving the Yugoslav crisis extend and refine this 
principle o f guaranteeing citizens« entitlement to national identity by means of 
international supervision, thereby departing from the old Paineite maxim that 
all sovereignty appertains to the territorially bounded nation. The EC report 
coordinated by the former French Justice Minister and President o f France's 
Constitutional Court, Robert Badinter, called for applications for EC recogni­
tion of the statehood of the various Yugoslav republics and shortly thereafter 
recommended the recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia, subject to 
their government's acceptance of formal guarantees of the civil and political 
freedoms of national minorities, the acceptance o f international arms control 
agreements, and no forcible redrawing o f existing nation-state boundaries.
The report, implemented only in part and plagued by war, has far-reaching 
implications for the subject of nationhood, nationalism and democracy. It 
supposes that governments have a primary obligation to respect the wishes of 
their populations, but it does not fall back on the old premise that each nation 
requires a sovereign state covering the territory in which it lives. »Where the 
sentiment of nationality exists in any force«, wrote J.S. Mill, »there is a prima 
facie case for uniting all the members o f the nationality under the same 
government, and a government to themselves apart.« The Badinter report spots 
a murderous difficulty lurking in this early modern doctrine o f national 
self-determination: If the political boundaries o f the earth are to be fixed by the 
criterion o f nationhood then, since nations do not see eye to eye (why other­
wise have state borders?) and do not live in discrete geographic entities, then 
there will be no end to boundary disputes. Every border is seen as necessarily 
faulty and as capable of improvement through the annexation o f some outlying 
territory in which one's own nation is living; and since this annexation must 
normally be imposed by the conqueror upon the conquered, the struggle for 
»national autonomy« contains the seeds of »territorial cleansing«, pushing and 
shoving, refugees, statelessness, pogroms and war. The report correctly under­
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stands that in the European context civil wars sparked off by nationalist 
pressures, rather than war between homogeneous nation-states, have become 
the major threat to regional stability.
The Badinter report also reminds Europeans of the increasingly multi-national 
character of their states. O f course, most European states have always been 
multi-national, but recently that fact has been accentuated by large-scale 
migrations. The permanent entry into western Europe of more than 15 million 
non-EC people during the past half-century has ensured that mono-national 
states no longer exist, and that even the oldest and most culturally »homoge­
neous« o f civil societies in countries or regions such as Spain, England, 
Portugal, France and Germany are now vertical mosaics of nationalities which 
do not humbly accept their position as satellites of the currently dominant 
national identity. The report challenges the early modern assumption that 
national loyalties are exclusive, and that democracy is therefore only possible 
in a nationally homogenous state.
The report calls instead for a new compromise between nations within states. It 
sees that the peaceful and democratic functioning of European states and 
societies necessitates reliance upon supra-national monitoring and enforce­
ment mechanisms and it urges recognition of the new principle that the various 
nations o f any single state are entitled to their nationhood, and thus to live 
differently , as free equals. The Badinter report »de-politicizes« and 
»de-territorializes« national identity. It recaptures something o f the eighteenth- 
century view, championed by thinkers like Burke and Herder, that nationality 
is best understood as a cultural entity, that is, as an identity belonging to civil 
society, not the state. It sees national identity as a civil entitlement of citizens, 
the squeezing or attempted abolition of which, even when ostensibly pursued 
by states in the name either of higher forms of human solidarity or of protect­
ing the »core national identity« (Isaiah Berlin), serves only to trigger off 
resentment, hatred and violence among national groupings.
3. O f equal importance as a guarantor of national identity and democracy 
against nationalism is a factor that has been barely discussed in the literature 
on the subject: the development o f a pluralist mosaic of identities within civil 
society. This third antidote to nationalism is as effective as it is paradoxical. It 
presumes that the survival and flourishing of national identity is only possible 
within a self-organizing civil society, which, however, provides spaces for 
citizens to act upon other chosen or inherited identities, thus limiting the 
probable role o f national identity in the overall operation of state and civil 
institutions and political parties, communications media and other intermedi­
ary bodies. The paradox bears a striking parallel to the question of religious 
tolerance: the practice of a particular religion in a multi-religious society
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requires -  if bigotry and bloodshed is to be avoided -  the principle o f freedom 
of religious worship, which in practice entails recognition o f the legitimacy of 
other religions and, hence, the need for secularism which simultaneously 
guarantees the freedom not to be religious. The same maxim ought to be 
carried over into matters of national identity, for it is clear that to model either 
state institutions or civil society solely on the principle of national identity 
means privileging one aspect of citizens« lives, devaluing others, and contra­
dicting the pluralism so vital for a democratic civil society, thus rendering 
those citizens« lives nation-centred and one-dimensional and, thus, susceptible 
to the rise of nationalism.
The straitjacketing effect of nation-centred politics in Croatia has been 
well-described by Slavenka Drakulić: »Nationalism has been forced on people 
like an ill-fitting shirt. You may feel that the sleeves are too short and the collar 
too tight. You might not like the colour, and the cloth may itch. But you wear it 
because there is no other. No one is allowed not to be Croatian.«20 The 
converse o f this point is that an open, self-governing civil society protected by 
various tiers of state institutions requires the cultivation o f a complex habitat 
of nested spaces in which citizens can protect themselves against the dangers 
of »uprootedness« in a democracy by learning how to belong to a variety of 
organizations which enable them to put down roots, thereby preserving par­
ticular memories of the past, a measure o f stability in the present, and particu­
lar expectations for the future. These spaces can further counteract nationalist 
pressures by helping citizens to overcome their own parochialism. Through 
their participation in the relatively local organizations o f civil society, citizens 
find the most effective cure of their localism by learning about the wider 
world, coming to see that their sense of national identity - thinking and feeling 
themselves to be German, Irish or Turkish - is not essentially superior to that of 
other nations, and that nationality is only one possible identity among others.
4. Perhaps the most difficult to cultivate antidote to nationalism is the fostering 
of an international civil society in which citizens o f various nationalities can 
intermingle, display at least a minimal sense o f mutual understanding and 
respect, and generate a sense of solidarity, especially in times o f crisis, for 
example during natural disasters, economic collapse or political upheaval.
During the second half of the eighteenth century, this friendship among citi­
zens of various nations was called cosmopolitanism. Exposure to foreign 
contacts came in a variety of overlapping and sometimes contradictory ways: 
young men sent abroad to study; foreigners invited and welcomed as teachers; 
involvement in European wars which took »nationals« elsewhere in Europe; 
increased travel among the »respectable« classes and regular diplomatic rela­
20. Slavenka Drakulić, »The Smothering Pull o f  Nationhood«, Yugofax( 31 October 1991), p. 3.
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tions with courts; expanding commerce; and the ever faster and wider circula­
tion o f foreign fashions in philosophy, letters, instruction, dress and social 
intercourse. A history o f eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism has yet to be 
written, but it is clear that in the writings of Pietro Verri, Immanuel Kant, 
Thomas Paine and others the »true cosmopolite« and the »loyal patriot« were 
one and the same figure.21 There was seen to be no contradiction between 
feeling oneself to be a citizen of the wider world [nb the Greek roots of 
/cosmopolites from kosmos, world and polites, citizen] and wanting to en­
lighten and to transform that little corner of the European world where one had 
been born or had been brought by destiny to live, work, love and to die. The 
phase o f early modern cosmopolitanism soon declined. Paine continued until 
his last breath to champion the cause of republican democracy around the 
world and Kant still looked at the history of the world in weltbürgerlicher 
Absicht, but these figures were among the last voices of a declining age. With 
the French revolution the era o f cosmopolitanism declined and into its place 
stepped nationalism, nation-state building and nation-state rivalry. Some con­
tinued to work for »internationalism«, guided by the principle that »in propor­
tion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility 
o f one nation to another will come to an end« (Marx and Engels). But slowly 
and surely the word patriot became charged with all the hatred and love of 
modern nationalism, while the word cosmopolite became the symbol of an 
ideal political unity that in practice could never be achieved.
A pressing theoretical and political question in today's Europe is whether a 
new form o f the old cosmopolitanism is developing in tandem with the process 
o f supra-national political integration in the west and the attempted disman­
tling of totalitarian regimes in parts of central-eastern Europe. Is the growth of 
an international civil society in Europe possible or actual? Raymond Aron is 
among those who have answered firmly in the negative: »Rights and duties, 
which in Europe, as elsewhere, are interdependent, can hardly be called 
multinational. In fact, they are quintessentially national...Though the European 
Community tends to grant all the citizens of its member states the same 
economic and social rights, there are no such animals as ’European citizens1. 
There are only French, German, or Italian citizens.«22
21. The Italian case is examined in Franco Venturi, Italy and the Enlightenment. Studies in a 
Cosm oplitan Century  (New York, 1972). See also Thomas J. Schlereth, The Cosm opolitan  
Ideal in Enlightenment Thought: Its Form and Function in the Ideas o f  Franklin, Hume and  
Voltaire, 1694 - 1790  (Notre Dame and London, 1977); Eugen Lemberg, Geschichte des 
Nationalism us in Europa (Stuttgart, 1950), pp. 123-127; Joseph Texte, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau and the Cosm opolitan Spirit in Literature: A Study o f  the Literary Relations 
between France and E ngland during the Eighteenth Century (London and New York, 1899).
22. Raymond Aron, »Is Multinational Citizenship Possible?«, Social Research, Winter 1974, pp. 
652-653.
54 John Keane
Aron's conclusion is based not only on the legal tautology that individuals can 
only become citizens because they belong to a sovereign state which is the sole 
guarantor of citizenship rights and duties. It also does not take account of the 
growth o f multi-national states and societies and the trend towards the defini­
tion o f the rights of European citizenship, available to all who live within the 
European Community region. If and when the Maastricht Treaty o f Union is 
finally ratified and implemented, this trend will be greatly strengthened. Citi­
zens o f any state resident in another member state will be entitled to vote and 
to stand for office at the levels o f local government and the European parlia­
ment. Citizens will enjoy the rights to information across frontiers, to petition 
the European Parliament, and to make use o f a Parliamentary Ombudsman. 
And they will be entitled, when travelling abroad, to full diplomatic protection 
by any other member EC state.
These projected entitlements provide further evidence that Europe - at least the 
Europe o f the European Community - is witnessing the slow, unplanned, blind 
and painful birth of a new species o f political animal, the European citizen. 
This trans-national citizenry is not yet constitutionally guaranteed. Its »infor­
mal« or pre-legal status renders it less than fully visible, ensures its strength as 
a normative ideal, and makes it vulnerable to countervailing trends. The 
habitat of the new European citizen is an emerging international civil society 
of personal contacts, networks, conferences, political parties, social initiatives, 
trade unions, small businesses and large firms, friendships, local and regional 
forums. Within this non-governmental habitat, individuals and groups o f vari­
ous nations and persuasions take advantage of new communications technolo­
g ie s -fa x  machines, answerphones, satellite broadcasting-w hich break down 
the apparently »natural« barriers o f geographic distance and state borders, 
increase the physical and cultural mobility of people, and even simulate the 
possibility of being simultaneously in two or more places. The new European 
citizens intermingle across frontiers for various purposes without making a 
cult of national origins, national identity, and »foreigners«. These citizens see 
and feel the importance of the metaxu (Simone Weil). They value nests, such 
as national identity, in which citizens are wanned and nourished and gain 
confidence in themselves. Yet they also recognize otherness as a right and a 
duty for everybody. These new citizens maintain that in the contemporary 
world identity is more a matter of politics and choice than fate. They have an 
allergic reaction to nationalism and deep empathy for people suffering dis­
crimination or enforced exile from their cherished nations or territories. They 
are humble about their national identity, interested in others, concerned for 
their well-being, and consequently unwillingto indulge the feelings of revenge 
and narcissistic satisfaction characteristic of nationalists. European citizens 
are late modern cosmopolitans.
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No doubt the internationalization o f civil society is destroyed by nationalism 
and genocidal war, as in south-central Europe, where for many people daily 
life is now a non-citizens« hell o f  expulsion, terror, and bloodshed. These 
social exchanges among a plurality of citizens can also be squeezed or suffo­
cated by the power o f transnational corporations (such as Ford, Volkswagen 
and Sony) seeking to co-ordinate their national markets, to trim and discipline 
their workforces, and to dominate European social life through profit-driven 
matrix management and marketing. It is also true that xenophobes and other 
anti-democratic forces are taking advantage o f the new European habitat. 
Nevertheless the long-term growth of European-wide exchanges among citi­
zens whose social and political views are predominantly pluralist and republi­
can is among the most remarkable features of contemporary Europe. Within 
these exchanges, there are few traces of Marxian class struggle politics and 
nineteenth-century dreams of abolishing state institutions, and nationalism is 
considered an anathema. Instead there is an underlying belief that not only 
Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, but indeed the world beyond, should be 
a coat of many colours, a region marked by a precarious, non-violent yet 
permanently contested balance between governors and citizens.
Sometimes this new democratic republicanism erupts dramatically, as in the 
velvet revolutions of 1989-1991. At other times, it is expressed through vague 
references to citizenship rights and duties across frontiers (as in the Maastricht 
Treaty o f Union). But most often the formation of a European civil society is 
an undramatic, nearly invisible process that seems unworthy o f the attention of 
journalists, intellectuals and policy makers. It clearly requires detailed socio­
logical investigation. For could it be that this new European citizenry, provid­
ing that it is not stillborn and that it is nurtured with adequate funding and legal 
and political guarantees, will prove to be the best antidote yet invented to the 
perils o f nationalism and the poisonous fruits of democracy?

